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„Und wer bin ich denn?" Wordplay and Identity 
in Tieck's William Lovell 
I. Introduction: Reading for Wordplay* 
Ludwig Tieck plays with words. Friedrich Schlegel once noted that, 
„Tiecks Gedichte sind d[er] Form nach Wortspiele und das ist d[ie] 
Grundlage d[er] romantischen 7c[Poesie].'q The present study focuses 
on wordplay not in Tieck's poems but in his epistolary novel William 
Lovell2 (1795). It follows Schlegel's suggestion by examining word-
play as a means of entry into the foundation of Romantic poetics, and 
it argues that the play of language in this novel insinuates and even 
determines identity. 
What do we mean by wordplay? A brief detour through Tieck's fa-
mous tale „Der blonde Eckbert" will serve to develop a concept of 
wordplay in Tieck's prose before turning to William Lovell. The sto-
ry demonstrates succinctly how language insinuates identity: Its see-
mingly insignificant words simultaneously reflect the structures and 
patterns of the narrative they convey. 
„Der blonde Eckbert" revolves around questions of origin. It first 
relates the story of Bertha's past and then tries to sort out the various 
characters' relationships to this narrated past. Several critics have 
shown how the overlapping origins and complex repetitions are in-
scribed into the characters' names. The connection between the half-
siblings Eckbert and Bertha, for instance, is indicated through their 
half-identical names.3 Another linguistic correspondence indicates the 
* I owe thanks to Fritz Breithaupt and Daniel Magilow. Their suggestions improved 
the manuscript in numerous places. 
1 Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe [=KA], hg. v. Ernst Beh-
ler et al, Paderborn 1958 ff. Bd. XVI, 327, Nr. 878. 
2 Ludwig Tieck: William Lovell: Further citations from this volume appear parenthe-
tically, hg. v. Walter Münz. Stuttgart 1986. 
3 Bernhard Greiner offers one example of such a reading, „Pathologie des Erzählens. 
Tiecks Entwurf der Dichtung im »Blonden Eckbert*." In: Deutschunterricht 39/1 
(1971), 111-123, here 116. 
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story's constitutive dejä vu - that Walther is really „die Alte."4 Fritz 
Breithaupt adds Bertha's Eltern to the list of „-alter" characters and 
shows that they all occupy the same position in the story: They are 
betrayed by the ,,-bert" characters.5 The story's dynamic turns on the 
revelation of suppressed identities, but the playful register of the name 
already reveals, or at least intimates, these identities. „Wordplay" thus 
refers to how Tieck attends closely to the letter of writing and exploits 
linguistic connections to load seemingly insignificant words with ex-
tra import.6 Furthermore, the story thematizes reading for precisely 
this kind of wordplay. Once the past shifts from fact to question, Ber-
tha and Eckbert must scrutinize all the „unbedeutenden Worten" and 
every „unbedeutende Kleinigkeit" for potential clues that reveal a hid-
den logic.7 They suspect throughout that what seem like insignificant 
surface details in fact yield the traces of an important hidden design. 
The problem with this concept of wordplay, though, is that it does 
not seem to apply to the novel in question. Wordplay in „Eckbert" is 
a matter of recognizing the hidden significance of apparently insigni-
ficant words, whereas the characters in William Lovell deride this ve-
ry kind of reading. Comtesse Blainville, for instance, would despise 
the minute reading required of (and by) Eckbert, as when she pro-
claims in a moment of exasperation, „dies Jagen nach Wortspielen 
und Verdrehungen des Sinnes, - o es gibt nichts Häßlicheres, wenn 
man soeben etwas Venünftiges gesprochen hat" (76). Here, „word-
play" does not mean to find an inherent sense hidden in words but, 
rather, to twist and distort words, to perceive a register of meaning 
where none exists. Christoph Brecht reinforces this appraisal from a 
4 Maria Tatar notes that, by subtracting „W" and „h," Walther becomes Alter, the mas-
culine form of „die Alte." See „Unholy Alliances: Narrative Ambiguity in Tieck's 
,Der blonde Eckbert,"4 in: MLN 102/3 (1987), 608-626. 
5 Fritz Breithaupt: „Der blonde Eckbert, 1797". In: Encyclopedia of German Litera-
ture, hg. v. Matthias Konzett. Chicago 2000, Vol. II, 937. 
6 This definition is not imposed on Tieck retroactively. The homophonic names from 
„Eckbert" qualify as examples of wordplay even according to the standards of 
Tieck's time. August Bernhardi, who counts Tieck among the founders of a new 
German poetic language, defines „Wortspiel" in 1803 as „Die Verknüpfung zweier 
Sprachsphären, welche gleichtönen, wobei aber eine bestimmte Betrachtung der Be-
deutung beider vorkommt [...]." Bernhardi, Sprachlehre, Hildesheim 1973, Nach-
druck der Ausgabe Berlin 21803, Bd. II, 396. Bernhardi Stresses that such phonetic 
correspondences do not exist for their own, purely musical sake; they draw attenti-
on to a more fundamental affinity between two concepts. „Wordplay," therefore, 
does not denote a free play of signifiers in which „anything goes." Its phonetic play 
remains constrained by what one can confirm through meaningful affinity. 
7 Ludwig Tieck: Werke in vier Bänden, hg. v. Marianne Thalmann, München, Bd. II, 
22. 
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critical perspective: „Tiecks poetisch am wenigsten verschlüsselte 
Dichtung ist seine dunkelste, die am meisten rätselhafte."8 Although 
William Lovell, according to Brecht, is Tieck's most obscure work, it 
is also his least encrypted work. It does not require the same kind of 
decipherment that „Eckbert" does. In William Lovell, words are play-
ful not by dint of a surfeit of meaning but a paucity of meaning. They 
are mere playthings because language always means less than it says. 
Despite the assertions of characters and critics, I shall be arguing 
that William Lovell is indeed an encrypted narrative. It employs word-
play similar to that in „Eckbert" because in this novel, too, Tieck con-
structs identity through the play of language. Such a reading interve-
nes in two long-standing discussions surrounding the novel. First, it 
forces one to reconsider the frequently voiced crisis of communicati-
on and the riddle of the incommunicable self. The self is a riddle -
but not an insoluble riddle in which the soul is eternally absent from 
expression. Like any riddle, it is solved by deciphering playfully en-
crypted signifiers. Second, reading in this way returns to the question 
of Lovell as a character without character. It shows how Lovell lacks 
an essential character because the play of language imposes his cha-
racter, his identity, upon him. 
IL Wordplay in William Lovell 
If the novel's characters ridicule the wordplay uncovered in „Eck-
bert," what kind of wordplay do they espouse instead? Balder, the 
melancholic character most removed from human interaction, formu-
lates it as forcefully as anyone: „der Mensch steht unter dem Affen, 
eben deswegen, weil er die Sprache hat, denn sie ist die kläglichste 
und unsinnigste Spielerei [...]" (208). In William Lovell, one plays 
with words because language is a meaningless game. 
One plays this game with either cynical despair or with cynical 
cunning; one either laments or exploits its insufficiencies. The attitu-
des of William Lovell and Burton Sr. represent these two positions, 
respectively, although almost every character comments on the inade-
quacy of language at one point or another. Lovell, for instance, asks, 
„Ob ich mit Worten, oder Karten, Definitionen, Würfeln oder Versen 
spiele, gilt das nicht alles gleich?" (507). The facets of dice and the si-
gnifiers on cards exist independently of any referent; rolling a six 
8 Christoph Brecht: Die gefährliche Rede. Sprachreflexion und Erzählstruktur in der 
Prosa Ludwig Tiecks. Tübingen 1993, 11. 
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does not mean six of anything, nor does a queen refer to any real ru-
ler. They are empty signifiers that acquire value only within the chan-
ce combinations of a game. Lovell's comparison voices the novel's 
frequent complaint that words do not correspond adequately to ob-
jects in the world. They too have value only through the combinations 
they strike with other words. 
Burton Sr., in contrast, attaches great importance to the play of lan-
guage, for he sees it as a game played for advantage over (and 
against) others. He writes in his diary, „Es ist aber, als wenn der Un-
terricht aller meiner Lehrer, ja selbst meines Vaters, nur dahin ginge, 
daß ich lügen und mit den Worten spielen lernte" (395). Rather than 
lament the disjunction between words and things, Burton uses it to his 
advantage by concealing his intentions and influencing others through 
empty eloquence. 
From both perspectives, it is a familiar crisis of communicability 
that reduces language to a mere game. Words cannot convey things 
adequately and are therefore always detached from the objects or 
emotions that give rise to them. Christoph Brecht refers to the resul-
ting inauthenticity of language as a „Totalisierung des Rhetori-
schen."9 Burton's totalization of rhetoric has a particular figure in 
mind, the captatio benevolentiae, an expression of flattery employed 
to win favor. Captatio benevolentiae is the figure of linguistic insuf-
ficiency when one has no interest in overcoming the disjunction inhe-
rent in language, and when one chooses, instead, to exploit it in order 
to deceive. 
Other characters, though, are far less enthusiastic about the inevita-
ble inauthenticity of communication. The refrain recurs often enough 
to become tiresome. To cite but one of the many examples, William 
Lovell writes, „Ich wollte Dir so vieles sagen, und weiß nun keine 
Worte zu finden'4 (242). The characters are always at a loss for words 
because no word can capture what they would like to convey. Those 
who lament the inadequacy of language find themselves locked in a 
prison of „dead signs" (metaphors of criminality permeate the novel) 
that never lead back to an object. From this pessimistic perspective, 
the proper figure for words detached from their origin is the riddle. 
As the wor(l)d-weary William Lovell puts it, „Alles ist ein vorüberge-
hend Rätsel, fades Wortspiel und langweiliger Zeitvertreib." (362). 
Here, wordplay does not provoke close reading. These characters 
know better than to waste time trying to solve riddles because they 
are all too aware of the insufficient medium of language. 
9 Brecht (Anm. 8), 25. 
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The characters in Tieck's novel feel the disjunction between words 
and things most acutely when they attempt to describe inner states. 
That is, words are never more detached from their origin than when 
they are supposed to originate in the self, in emotion, or in the soul. 
Lovell writes to Amalie: „Mit welchen Worten soll ich die Gefühle 
ausdrücken, die mein Herz erweitern und zusammenziehen? Kein 
Zeichen entspricht der lebendigen Glut in meinem Innern [...]" 
(61).10 Lovell's repeated complaints demarcate the self as an interior 
that cannot be expressed and define it in its imperviousness to langu-
age. Roland Borgards, reflecting on Lovell's predicament, writes, 
„Zwischen Innen und Außen wird nun so scharf geschieden, daß kein 
Zeichen im Außen dem Gefühl im Innen zu entsprechen vermag 
[...]."u Or, as Brecht puts it, „Das Individuelle ist niemals in der 
Sprache."12 The incommunicability of the self turns the prevalent me-
taphor of criminality and incarceration on its head: Language appears 
as a prison from which the self is locked out. 
III. The Riddle of Identity 
William's letters assert that the self is the most obscure origin of lan-
guage. It is that which cannot be captured in language, which is why 
the self appears as the riddle par excellence. It appears as a riddle ex-
plicitly, as when Andrea asks, „Was kann ich also für meine Seele tun, 
die wie ein unaufgelöstes Rätsel in mir wohnt?" (364), but also im-
plicitly in questions such as „O und wer bin ich selbst?" and „Wer ist 
das seltsame Ich, das sich so mit mir selber herumzankt?" (324/639). 
The novel casts the self as a problem to be solved, as a tension to be 
resolved within the individual. These characters do not idly compare 
the self to a riddle; by putting it repeatedly in the form of questions -
including the one in the title of this paper - they add a sense of ur-
gency to solving the riddle of the self. 
At the same time, however, they cast the self as a riddle that cannot 
be solved. Rosa says of this futility, „Ja wohl, lieber Freund, es ist um 
10 One finds this sophisticated and cynical attitude toward language contrasted in the 
servant Willy's „naive" letters. He writes to his brother, „aber das kannst Du mir 
doch auf mein Wort glauben, daß sie [meine Briefe] aus dem allerbesten Herzen 
kommen" (89). According to the skeptical assertions of other characters, though, let-
ters could never correspond to the heart. 
11 Roland Borgards: Die Schrift, das Rätsel, der Mensch. Ludwig Tieck's William Lo-
vell In: Athenäum 8, 1998, 231-253, here 239. 
12 Brecht (Anm. 8), 36. 
156 Brian Tucker 
die Menschen ein seltsames Ding! Ein Rätsel, das keiner je ganz auf-
lösen wird" (300).13 Rosa and the novel's other characters define the 
self negatively as an absence in language: Only its non-appearance 
proves its existence. The riddle of the self, in this sense, represents an 
insoluble genitive: It exists only as an incommunicable interior, and 
successful expression would be its demise. No one will solve this 
riddle because it inheres in the identity of the self. To dissolve the 
riddle is to dissolve the self that depends on it. 
Roland Borgards also analyzes the relationship between language 
and incommunicable essence. He finds both language and the human 
being - the term he uses is „Mensch" - structured according to the 
principle of the riddle. He writes: „Lösung und Unlösbarkeit der Auf-
gabe sind dadurch bestimmt, daß der Mensch und die Schrift nach 
dem gleichen Modell gedacht werden, in dem die sichtbare, lesbare 
Oberfläche Zeichen einer unsichtbaren, unlesbaren Tiefe ist."14 Bor-
gards's analysis focuses on the depth-hermeneutic split between inte-
rior and exterior, surface and depth, and it correctly points up how the 
characters cast both the empirical body and the surface of language 
as veils that conceal the depth of the soul. In this way, Borgards com-
plements Brecht's assertion that what is individual is never in langu-
age. Indeed, from this perspective, the self (the interior essence of 
„Mensch") lacks any external manifestation, since even the body is 
only a deceptive covering that does not lead to the self. For Lovell, 
„das Rätsel seines eigenen Ichs" reiterates the ineluctable predica-
ment of communication, for, like language, it too is constituted by a 
„fatale Spaltung in Außenfläche und Innentiefe."15 
IV. The Name in William Lovell, the Name „William Lovell" 
Tieck's novel depicts the disjunction between words and things and 
centers it on the self. Within this context, should not the name be the 
most problematic kind of word? A name is a completely arbitrary la-
13 The vocabulary of selfhood in Tieck's novel is inconsistent: the characters refer to 
the incommunicable entity alternately as the heart, the soul, the I, and the self (see 
pages 95, 364, 629, and 362). This much is clear: „Mensch," as used in the above 
passage, refers to a composite structure of exterior and interior, while the other 
terms, although not interchangeable, all refer to the interior essence. The present 
study uses „self throughout, and it takes „identity" as the problem of self-under-
standing. 
14 Borgards (Anm. 11), 231. He expounds this thesis in detail on pages 244-248. 
15 Borgards (Anm. 11), 246 and 244. 
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bei; it has nothing to do with the self to which it refers. In fact, the 
novel's most cynical and melancholic characters, Andrea and Balder, 
suggest that it would be possible to forgo naming altogether. Andrea 
asks: 
Was bleibt uns übrig, William, wenn wir alle leere Namen verbannen 
wollen? - Freilich nichts zu philosophieren und mit Enthusiasmus für 
die Tugend und gegen das Laster zu reden, kein Stolz, kein Gepränge 
mit Redensarten, aber immer noch ebenso viel Raum um zu leben. (364) 
He assumes that names are empty; they fail, as communicative vehic-
les, to convey their object. Andrea proposes a simple solution to the 
totalization of rhetoric: If the names of things are detached from the 
truth of things, why not simply do away with the useless names? This 
would require sacrificing the rhetorical splendor of empty expressi-
ons, but it would not affect life itself, which is never present in langu-
age (in its dead signs). Balder implements Andrea's suggestion when 
he becomes a hermit and retreats from (almost all) human interaction. 
He writes to Lovell, „Ich weiß nicht in welchem Waldgebirge ich 
wohne, denn ich erkundige mich nie mehr nach Namen" (367). The 
characters in the novel repeatedly ask who they are, but the answer 
lies not in language, especially not in names. 
We can test this logic of the name against William Lovell, certain-
ly the most important case study, since he is the novel's central cha-
racter, as well as its eponym. His name stands before and above all 
others. Tieck was well versed in English literature, and numerous 
scholars have tried to determine the source from which he drew this 
character's English name.16 The most likely source of the name Lo-
vell is Ben Johnson's 1629 comedy The New Inn, which includes a 
character named Lovel and corresponds to William Lovell in three as-
pects.17 First, biographically: Tieck translated other works by John-
16 Consult Thalmann's notes for a brief synopsis of literary influences on the novel. 
Ludwig Tieck: Werke, Bd. I, 1022. 
17 Another suggested, though less likely, source is Clara Reeve's 1777 Gothic novel 
The Old English Baron, which also includes a character named Lovel. Walter Münz 
lists parallels between Reeve's novel and William Lovell. See Indiviuum und Sym-
bol, Bern 1975, 101. If one were forced, perhaps by an ill-conceived exam questi-
on,'to find a connection between Reeve's novel and Tieck's works, „Der blonde 
Ec'kbert" might actually offer more points of comparison. Characters named Philip 
and Walter figure prominently in Reeve's novel, and Eckbert's friend is Philipp 
Walther. Moreover, the themes of knights visiting one another's castles, a noble 
child raised (unknowingly) by poverty-stricken foster parents, and the supernatural 
return of the past all demonstrate a stronger bond to the fairy-tale than to William 
Lovell. 
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son (Valpone and Epicoene), and he was involved with his works du-
ring the same years that he wrote William LovelL1* Second, themati» 
cally: Both fill the role of a stereotypically melancholic character.19 
Finally and most importantly: The two agree formally, in that both 
employ expressive names, names that correspond analogically to their 
characters' types. This common feature of seventeenth-century litera-
ture is present in Johnson's comedy, as Love-1 is the character who 
speaks in defense of love; he represents love itself. Tieck's Love-11, in 
a similar, albeit less platonic fashion, is caught repeatedly in the thro-
es of love. Indeed it seems that he does little in the story except con-
tinually fall in love - to Amalie, the Comtesse Blainville, Rosaline, 
and Emilie. 
Thus, Tieck's citation from Johnson does not just borrow a name; 
it also cites an analogical relationship between name and character, 
word and thing. When Fritz Wüstling writes, then, that Tieck's cha-
racter has only a name in common with Johnson's play, he overlooks 
the relational correspondence of naming in the two works.20 Like 
other contemporaneous dramatists, Johnson frequently uses names to 
indicate character types: The New Inn also contains characters such 
as Prudence, who is circumspect, Ferret, who is clever and quick, and 
Frampul, who is ill tempered, as the homophonic adjective „fram-
pold" suggests. They all embody the attributes suggested by their na-
mes. Tieck, too, makes use of expressive names in his work. In Peter 
Lebrecht - which appeared anonymously, thus giving the name as the 
author's pseudonym - he writes: 
Ich ward in eine mir ganz unbekannte Welt hineingefahren, ohne Men-
schenkenntnis und Kenntnis meiner selbst, ohne genau zu wissen, wer 
ich sei; nur mit dem Namen Lebrecht ausgestattet, der, wenn er mir auch 
eigentlich nicht zukam, mir doch immer als Vorschrift dienen konnte, 
nach der ich handelte.21 
Lebrecht realizes that his name is not completely expressive; he does 
not deserve a name that connotes wholesome living. At the same time, 
though, he does not know clearly who he is (the same central questi-
18 See Fritz Wüstling: Tiecks William Lovell. Ein Beitrag zur Geistesgeschichte des 
18. Jahrhunderts. Halle 1912, 120 f. 
19 Is it furthermore a thematic coincidence that, in London, Lovell ends up „in einem 
gemeinen Wirtshause, unter den niedrigsten, aber originellsten Menschen" (421), 
the same comedic setting as in The New Inn? 
20 Wüstling (Anm. 18), 121. 
21 Ludwig Tieck: Werke, Bd. I, 82. See also Bd. I, 96, where Lebrecht reads names 
such as „Bärenklau" and „Greifenhahn" expressively: „Sie deuten nur auf Raub und 
Mord und Unterdrückung." 
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on in Lovell), and he has only his name as a guide. The words embed-
ded in his name direct his behavior: nomen est omen. 
Furthermore, both Johnson's play and Tieck's novel call attention 
to the expressive relationship between name and character. In The 
New Inn, Prudence tells Lovel, for instance, „Do your endeavours, in 
the name of Love/'22 In another scene, the characters find Lovel's na-
me insufficiently expressive, and they inquire as to its exact meaning: 
Host. But is your name Love-ill, sir, or Love-well? 
I would know that. 
Lovel I do not know't myself 
Whether it is. [...]23 
Tieck's novel also hints self-reflexively at the relationship between 
name and character, but in his case, the heavy-handed humor works as 
a subtle joke, since the sprechende Name Lovell, in his novel, „spe-
aks" only in a foreign tongue. In the first letter of the novel, Karl Wil-
mont describes Lovell to his friend Mortimer, and he also describes 
his own affection for Burton's sister: 
Sei nur ruhig, ich werde nie in die Grube fallen, die sich Lovell gegra-
ben hat! 
Ich habe mir ernsthaft vorgenommen, daß es keine Liebe werden soll, -
denn, - sieh, wie schön das zusammenhängt! - denn mein Vermögen ist 
gegen das ihrige viel zu geringe. -
Du lachst? - Und würde die Welt nicht über Dich lachen, wenn Du den 
Zusammenhang hier vermißtest? - (14) 
The first clue of the connection between Love-11 and love comes with 
the italicization of Liebe, which makes this word stand out and marks 
it as a proper name, since most names in the novel are italicized. 
Then, Wilmont interrupts his thought to implore his friend to see how 
nicely „that" hangs together. Could Wilmont's „that" simply mean the 
hanging together, the continuity, of pecuniary relationships, as he 
lacks the fortune to court Burton's sister? Perhaps, but the hyphens 
pull this interjection out of the flow of thought, and the „denn" on 
each side of the interjection brackets the effect it could have on the 
rest of the sentence. More likely is that Wilmont interrupts his thought 
to point out the bilingual play of Lovell and Liebe. Because his state-
ment continues on the same word that precedes the interjection one 
senses that the interjection might not comment on the thought that is 
to come but rather that it expresses the sudden aper?u of a humorous 
22 Ben Johnson: The New Inn, hg. v. Michael Hattaway, Manchester 1984, 
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connection in the preceding thought. Remember that these letters are 
supposedly written in English, which makes his pun on Lovell and lo-
ve much more obvious - at least at the level of fiction. It does hang 
together nicely, for when Wilmont assures his friend, „daß es keine 
Liebe werden soll,44 he simultaneously implies, „daß [er] kein[] [Lo-
ve-\l] werden soll.4' Finally, the laughter at the end of the passage con-
firms that there is a joke embedded in the preceding sentences. The 
joke would be on us, indeed, were we to take the characters' com-
plaints of empty names and words at face value, missing this direct 
connection between a name and a character's central attribute. 
This passage offers but one salient example of a thread that runs 
throughout the story: The narrative consistently identifies Lovell with 
love, not only thematically, in that he has many amorous affairs, but al-
so linguistically, through the same kind of connections at work in Wil-
mont's letter. Later in the story, the girl named „Ferdinand44 (an exam-
ple of a name that disguises identity, more specifically, gender) says to 
Lovell, „In diesem Zustande sah ich Sie, Lovell, und ein Gefühl, wie ich 
es noch nie gekannt hatte, bemächtigte sich meiner. Es war die Liebe, 
die mir bis dahin fremd geblieben war44 (578). Lovell embodies an emo-
tion, love, and it is only natural that, upon seeing the person, she imme-
diately recognizes the emotion he conveys. And when Lovell (disguised 
now under the pseudonym Anthonio, lest his true intentions be appa-
rent) finally seduces Rosaline, he closes his blissful letter to Rosa with 
the sentence, „Noch nie hab' ich mich so darüber gefreut, daß ich Lo-
vell bin44 (289).24 Thematically, Lovell is most happy to be himself 
when he is most in love, and semantically, this third-person reference to 
oneself would make less sense were it delivered by Wilmont or Burton. 
Tieck takes more than just a name from Johnson. He also takes a 
relationship between name and character (which, admittedly, is uni-
que neither to Johnson nor, in Tieck's oeuvre, to this particular novel), 
and, finally, he takes over the narrative's self-reflexive highlighting of 
that relationship. With all this play between English and German, it 
is ironic that the novel's first critics accused Tieck of plagiarizing an 
English work. A reviewer writing for the Jena Allgemeine Literatur-
Zeitung in 1797 states: 
23 Ben Johnson (Anm. 22), I.vi.95-97. 
24 LovelFs pseudonym reinforces this pattern of naming, for it too is drawn from a li-
terary source, a song, „welches mich [...] zuerst auf die Idee meiner Verkleidung 
führte, und aus dem ich sogar meinen Namen Antonio entlehnt habe" (272). He 
chooses the name because its connotations in cultural consciousness correspond to 
the attributes he adopts. The effect is not lost on Rosaline, who sings for him the sa-
me song, as Lovell reports, „weil es ihr so passend auf mich schien" (272). 
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Das ganze Werk sieht übrigens einer Uebersetzung eines mittelmäßigen 
englischen Originals gleich, obschon der Titel nichts davon sagt, Diese 
Muthmaßung wird durch einige Stellen bestätigt, die einer nur zu buch-
stäblichen [!] Uebersetzung ähnlich sehen.25 
This critic then points out specific passages in Tieck's novel that must 
be poor translations from English because they do not sound German 
enough. The review notes, for instance, „Was ein breiter Scherz seyn 
solle, wird mancher Leser bey B. II. S. 15 fragen, aber vielleicht ist 
das Wort flat nur unrichtig übersetzt.4'26 The claim that one can detect 
translated plagiarism in those expressions that deviate from idiomatic 
German becomes laughable when one realizes that Tieck does not 
translate what he borrows from English. He leaves the English word 
in the text and juxtaposes it with its German equivalent. Through a se-
ries of subtle hints, he underscores the direct link between name and 
character. 
The charge that Tieck translates from English too literally also mis-
ses its mark. At Tieck's request, A.W. Schlegel wrote a response for 
the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, defending him against the dual 
charges of poor translation and plagiarism. He refutes them in the sa-
me order, assuring the critic and the public „1. daß der Verf. ein gro-
ßer Kenner der englischen Sprache, 2. daß der Lovell ein deutsches 
Original ist."27 In fact, Tieck does not adhere too closely to the letter 
of his English source, and he makes Lovell a „German original" 
through a wordplay that requires a firm grasp of the English langua-
ge. In Johnson's The New Inn, the character is Herbert Lovel, the first 
name also being expressive because it connotes his military back-
ground.28 Tieck obviously did not literally copy this character into his 
novel: He changed the first name to William and added an „1" to the 
last name. (Even if one disregards Johnson's play as a source of the 
name, „Lovel" with only one „1" is still the more common form, and 
Tieck also had to choose a first name for his character.) In its final 
form, „William Lovell," the double „1" at the end of the name echoes 
the double „1" within the first name. They stand like quotation marks 
surrounding part of the name, and what they quote is not just an Eng-
25 A l l g e m e i n e Li tera tur-Zei tung, Nr. 337 (23 October 1797), reproduced in Mttnz 's 
edi t ion of Wil l iam Lovel l , 7 0 6 f. 
26 r£bd 
27 A l lgeme ine Literatur-Zei tung. Intelligenzblatt, Nr. 14 (24 January 1798), reprodu-
ced in M ü n z ' s edit ion of Wil l iam Lovell, 708 f. 
28 Michael Hattaway, editor of The New Inn, notes that Herbert means „bright-war-
rior" and derives from the Old High German Heriberte, meaning „bright army. Ben 
Johnson (Anm. 22), 57, note 7. 
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lish word but an English sentence: Will / am Love 11. The name of 
Tieck's character thus pronounces his identity directly: I am love. The 
idea of quotation marks around this „sentence" is not so far-fetched 
either, since using an expressive name to announce its character's 
identity is itself a kind of literary citation. 
To be fair to Tieck's critics, it should be noted that there is a passa-
ge in his novel that reads like a too-literal translation of English. At 
one point, Lovell saves Amalie from a burning house (from a fire that 
he had a hand in starting). As Amalie depicts the scene of her rescue 
to her friend Emilie, she writes, „Ich wußte nicht, ob ich träumte, oder 
wachte; der Fremde, der mich gerettet hatte, schloß mich in seine Ar-
me - ich bin Lovelll keuchte er mir mit erstickter Stimme entgegen" 
(481). The only thing this anti-hero can communicate to his former 
beloved is a partial translation of what his name has always said, „ich 
bin Lovell" He can only say that he is an instantiation of love. Ano-
ther partial translation of „I am love" occurs in the passage, „Noch 
nie hab' ich mich so darüber gefreut, daß ich Lovell bin" (289, em-
phasis added). In each case, an dement within the character's desi-
gnation becomes an attribute associated with that character. The spe-
cific figure for what occurs in Lovell's name is an adnominatio, in 
which one takes a proper name for its literal, paronomastic meaning. 
Because the sentence, „I am Love," is concealed within the name 
and dispersed over both its halves, one could describe it as a kind of 
hypogram (sub-text) in Ferdinand de Saussure's sense of that term: 
The character's signature is simultaneously an allusion and one that 
underlines the features of his face.29 It should be stressed that, even if 
Saussure's examples are more intricate, his method of reading for 
cryptographically dispersed names in Latin poetry accords entirely 
with the early Romantic notion of wordplay and its concomitant mo-
de of reading. When August Wilhelm Schlegel lectures on Petrarch, 
for example, he instructs the reader to attend to „die leisesten Bezie-
hungen, z.B. Ähnlichkeit im Laute des Namens,"30 as when Petrarch 
subtly alludes to his beloved Laura. According to Schlegel, „Es ist da-
her nicht eine seltsame Spielerei, sondern strenge Wahrheit, wenn er 
den Namen seiner Geliebten durch Vaura andeutet: sie war seinem 
29 Consult Jean Starobinski: Les mots sous les mots. Paris 1971, 30 f. Saussure ex-
plains his choice of the term „hypogramme" by giving the following meanings, be-
sides signature: „soit faire allusion', soit reproduire par ecrit comme un notaire, un 
secretaire, soit meme (si Ton songeait ä ce sens special mais repandu) souligner au 
moyen du fard les traits du visage." 
30 August Wilhelm Schlegel: Geschichte der romantischen Literatur. Stuttgart 1965, 
204. 
„Und wer bin ich denn?' 163 
Gemüte der leise Hauch, die erquickende Frühlingsluft innerer Bele-
bung."31 These passages from his lecture support two important 
points: First, readers in Schlegel's circle were attuned to precisely the 
kind of encoded names and allusions that Tieck employs, and second 
they recognized such homophones as the aural manifestation of an 
underlying affinity. Wordplay becomes word-truth in Schlegel's state-
ment: Laura really is I'aura, a breeze or breath of air. The wordplay 
underlines her essential features. Tieck's novel assumes an even mo-
re radical position, though; it calls into question the very notion of an 
essential truth prior to phonetic play. 
Paul de Man pushes the Saussurean hypogram in this direction 
when he relates it to prosopopeia, the trope of personification, which, 
in his interpretation, means „to give a face and therefore implies that 
the original face can be missing or nonexistent."32 De Man's definiti-
on is suggestive for reading Tieck's novel because here, too, it is ne-
ver clear that Lovell possesses a face (a character, a self) prior to his 
name. The same structure is apparent in the passage from Peter Le-
brecht, when he sets out, „ohne genau zu wissen, wer ich sei; nur mit 
dem Namen Lebrecht ausgestattet, der [...] mir doch immer als Vor-
schrift dienen konnte [,..]."33 The name serves as a Vorschrift: It 
does not describe identity but rather prescribes it. It acts in the absen-
ce of identity as the script that comes before. In both cases, the name 
person-ifies the character by giving him his face. It produces the per-
son through the word, just as the name Lovell circumscribes the cha-
racter Lovell. 
V. The Malleable Character 
Although the characters repeatedly assert that language is a meaning-
less game, that it is the „unsinnigste Spielerei" itself (208), one finds 
in William Lovell a meaningful wordplay not so different from that of 
„Der blonde Eckbert."34 The connection between Lovell and love is, 
Ebd. Schlegel also gives an example of Petrarchan wordplay that moves in the op-
posite direction, from name to thing (adnominatio), as when Colonna occurs in con-
junction with an empirical column. 
Paul de Man: Hypogram and Inscription. In: The Resistance to Theory, Minneapo-
lis 1986, 27-53, here 44. 
Ludwig Tieck: Werke. Bd. I, 82. 
One could also adduce the name Walter Lovell, which refers to the same character 
as „der alte Lovell." The novel and the tale employ the same name correspondence 
(Walther-Alte). 
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however, more than a clever play oo words that highlights Tieck's lan-
guage skills. Because Heck situates it in a context of empty names 
and inadequate language, the expressive name subverts the prevalent 
discourse of linguistic crisis as it is articulated by the novel's charac-
ters (and as it has been taken up by critical reception).35 Letters in the 
novel repeatedly complain that words do not correspond to things, but 
the example of William Lovell indicates a direct correspondence bet-
ween words and things. The novel's central question, „Und wer bin 
ich denn?" thus represents far less of a crisis when the name provides 
a simple response: „ich bin Lovell" (638/481). The name solves the 
riddle of identity because the word itself determines identity. 
Despite the claim that the self can never be present within langua-
ge, Lovell shows that the self can never be outside of language. We 
find not an insurmountable gap between surface and depth, Schein 
and Sein, but rather a character that is pure surface: It derives from 
the words already embedded in the name, just as Sein is already pre-
sent within Schein. The novel's imagery of imprisonment makes mo-
re sense from this perspective: The character is confined within the 
connotations of its name. William Lovell suggests this way of reading 
when he asks, „Bin ich nicht in diesem Namen, in diesem Laut ein-
gekerkert, daß meine Seele nach ihrem Besitz und nach Freiheit 
schmachtet?" (199). He refers here to the name Amalie, but the point 
remains the same: Names are spaces within which one is incarcerated. 
LovelPs question furthermore underscores the phonetic quality, the 
„Laut," of the name. His name sounds like „love," a word sufficient 
to sound the depth of his character. And if we listen to the sound of 
other names, as well, we see that Lovell really is trapped within the 
sound of the name. After his romance with Ämalie fails and he returns 
to England, he replaces her with Emilie, the closest phonetic ersatz 
for the name he must possess. 
The function of the name in William Lovell is therefore completely 
removed from the „leere Namen" and „hohles Wort" of which the 
characters complain (364/309). In fact, it seems that it is not the word 
that is empty but rather its referent: The word takes precedence over 
the referent, steers it and determines it. If words cannot capture an 
emotion, it is because there is no emotion prior to the word that pro-
duces it. This is especially clear when Lovell seduces Emilie by tel-
ling her his story of suffering. He reports the scene to his friend: 
35 In addition to the works already cited, Alan CorkhilFs „Perspectives on Language 
in Ludwig Tieck's Epistolary Novel William Lovell" in: German Quarterly 58/2 
(1985), 173-183, traces the same theme. He finds in the novel a ubiquitous „lingui-
stic skepticism" (176). 
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Nie, Rosa, habe ich so gut gesprochen, und nie so tiefempfunden. [.. ] 
Ach was ist Wahrheit und Überzeugung im Menschen! Ich war jetzt von 
allem überzeugt, was ich da sagte, ich war schwermütig und in sie ver-
bebt, ich hätte mich wirklich in diesem Augenblicke ermorden können. 
One should note, first, the order of Lovell's statement: His powerful 
speech precedes his deep feeling. Indeed, the former brings the latter 
about, as it is his own rhetoric that persuades him into his emotions. 
Where is the incommunicable truth (Wahrheit) of the self in this scene? 
It seems that the truth of the self only comes about in the act of 
communication, just as the name precedes and produces the character 
type. 
The cynical take on language - as meaningless wordplay - over-
looks the force that an utterance delivers. When rhetoric determines 
essence, the deployed word takes on a power independent of its refe-
rent. That is, once identity is circumscribed by a name, or an emotion 
is nothing more than a word, then these names and words are adequa-
te substitutes for the things they represent (effect); they can act in their 
place. William Lovell writes to Rosa: „Ich nenne mir manchmal den 
Namen Amalie oder Rosaline, um alles, wie mit einem Zauberspruche, 
wieder zum Leben zu erwecken [...]" (358). The name in general has 
the power to bring something into being. Its utterance, like that of a 
magical incantation, produces an effect in the world. The name Lovell 
also elicits affect, usually hatred, in other characters. Karl Wilmont 
writes: „Sein Name brennt schmerzhaft in meiner Brust, wenn ich ihn 
nur durch einen Zufall nennen höre" (467). And Andrea, under the 
heading „Haß," recalls of Lovell Sr., „Ich konnte nicht an seinen Na-
men denken, ohne vor Wut zu zittern [...]" (623). The name produces 
the same effect that the person's presence would. Wilmont hates Lo-
vell because he seduced Emilie (whom Wilmont planned to marry) 
and persuaded her to elope with him. Thus, his pain results from both 
Lovell's deed and the effect of remembering the „Love" that it cost 
him. In Andrea's case, he hates Lovell Sr. (a grudge that structures the 
novel's entire plot) because they both tried to marry the same woman 
and Lovell Sr. won her hand. Again, the anger feeds not just on the 
person but also on the linguistic trace of what was lost to that person. 
The name conditions both the central character and the pre-established 
animosity into which he unwittingly steps.36 
Andrea's ultimate goal is to devastate Lovell Sr. by ruining his son. It is fitting that 
the revenge must travel across the son, who carries on the name Lovell and thereby 
the trace of Andrea's initial injury. 
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This analysis of the name casts new light on a long-running discus-
sion of Lovell as a character without character. In this regard, it is in-
teresting to note that Tieck's preface to the first volume reads: „Die-
se Geschichte hat vielleicht für diejenigen Leser einiges Interesse, die 
in einer Erzählung die Charaktere und ihre bestimmte Zeichnung für 
die Hauptsache halten" (8). One tends to find in the critical reception, 
however, the conviction that Tieck portrays his characters indistinct-
ly. Lovell, for example, does not know who he is (what kind of cha-
racter he is), a defect that makes him an easy target for Andrea's cor-
rupting scheme. 
Friedrich Schlegel, whose opinion of the novel oscillates between 
harsh criticism and comparisons with Goethe's work, takes up the no-
te sounded by Tieck's preface and writes, „Der einzige Charakter im 
Lovell ist er selbst, ein Mensch ohne Charakter."37 Schlegel's parado-
xical remark seems to run counter to Tieck's preface, an incongruity 
identical to the one Manfred Frank articulates when he asks, „Tiecks 
beste charakterologische Studie bringt also einen Menschen ohne 
Charakter zustande?"38 Frank takes the answer to be yes, and the ana-
lysis of the name Lovell confirms his assessment: Schlegel's note 
does not criticize the work so much as it captures what is distinctive 
in Tieck's character portrayal. Tieck depicts characters without iden-
tity, characters whose identity is inscribed by an external force, such 
as the name Love-11 stamping itself onto the novel's eponym. Thus, 
the portrayal really is the „main thing" in the novel, for it becomes a 
„bestimmende Zeichnung" when the character repeatedly fulfills the 
prophecy of its own name. Frank agrees that Tieck's poetological con-
siderations motivate the „Marklosigkeit" of his characters.39 Here, the 
power of the name foregrounds the powerlessness of an identity so 
malleable that it takes the shape of any linguistic marker attached to 
it. 
VI. Lovell, Criminal 
One could counter this argument for the linguistic constitution of the 
self by pointing out that LovelPs character cannot be reduced to love. 
Language, that is, does not produce the character completely because 
the character's complexity exceeds what the name contains. The con-
37 Friedrich Schlegel: KA XVI, 129, Nr. 527. 
38 Manfred Frank: Das Problem Zeit in der deutschen Romantik. München 21972,295. 
39 Frank (Anm. 38), 295 
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notations embedded in the name cannot account for Lovell's dark si-
de - his tendency toward jealousy, bitterness, deceit, and vengeance. 
Hence, on this view, there must remain an essential self in excess of 
its linguistic determinants. 
I submit, however, that what appears to contradict the evidence of 
the name actually reiterates that structure in a somewhat different 
form. In this case, a different Vorschrift acts in advance of identity -
not the name but the figures used to illuminate the self. We noted that 
the novel's most common metaphors are criminality and its related 
themes of incarceration, chains, and punishment. The mysterious 
group centered around Andrea frequently applies these to the self to 
illustrate its structure as an insurmountable gap between expression 
and essence. Through the course of the story, though, Lovell can on-
ly enact and literalize these figures for the self, so that here, too - de-
spite the claim of linguistic inadequacy - it is a linguistic marker that 
shapes his identity. The group corrupts the character by first corrup-
ting his language. 
Rosa employs the following psychological simile in a letter to Lo-
vell, „[...] und so wie der Mörder den noch halbbelebten Leichnam 
ängstlich mit Erde bedeckt, so verscharren wir mutwillig Empfindun-
gen, die sich in uns zum Bewußtsein emporarbeiten wollen" (325). 
Rosa's comparison returns to a bifurcation of the self, similar to what 
Borgards identifies in the novel, although here the split does not fall 
between body and soul but rather between consciousness and the un-
conscious. In this conception, the self is that which actively prevents 
its own discovery. Its essence remains a riddle because the conscious, 
writing self kills and conceals those feelings that should not rise to 
the surface. Rosa thus offers a pre-psychoanalytic image of the con-
flict between the conscious and unconscious layers of the psyche. It 
should be stressed that this figure of criminality brings one no closer 
to the nature of the fugitive self. It only reiterates the self's structure 
as something that conceals, withholds, and furtively strives to delay 
its own discovery. Its tenor is thus the same disjunction between ex-
terior signification and interior essence; the self appears once again 
as the absent center of discourse. 
As William Lovell enters Andrea's group, he increasingly adopts its 
discourse of the criminal self. Indeed, his letters in the second half of 
volume two are replete with references to criminals, chains, bars, pri-
sons, sentences, and executioners. For example, when he describes for 
Rosa his meeting with Andrea, he mirrors his friend's figure: „[...] so 
wie einem Verbrecher, der sich plötzlich in seinen widersprechenden 
Lügen gefangen fühlt, und dem nun das Wort im Mund erstarrt, - so 
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war mir in meinem Innern" (340-1). In its end effect, the passage 
seeks to illuminate the inner self by referring it to the criminal, the 
one who can never expose what his face conceals. The self remains 
incommunicable, and one must compensate for the disjunction bet-
ween words and truth with the approximations of figural language. 
In both cases, the criminal is a figure of form: It continues to struc-
ture the self as a self-perpetuating absence in language. But, as the 
story shows through the effects of the name, language used formally 
- as in the indexical form of the name - can contaminate, even con-
stitute the content of its referent. The form of Lovell's name becomes 
the content of his character. And in a similar leap, the figures for the 
form of the self (deception, disjunction) inscribe themselves as con-
tent upon the self. Lovell seems to take metaphor in its strong sense 
as „to transfer" or „carry over." He first carries Rosa and Andrea's fi-
gures over to his own letters. Then he increasingly ignores the „wie" 
in such statements, either explicit in simile or implicit in metaphor, 
and transfers the figures into reality.40 Within the totalization of rhe-
toric, figures do not simply approximate an absent truth; they make 
their own truth.41 
It is not surprising that, as Lovell literalizes and lives out these me-
taphors, he gradually embodies the criminal trying to evade capture 
and punishment. He literally becomes the murderer concealing a 
corpse - he first kills Pietro in a fight (over love, no less), but by the 
novel's end, he is responsible for at least five unnecessary deaths: be-
sides Pietro, Rosaline (whom he betrayed), Willy (whom he poiso-
ned), Comtesse Blainville (whom he caused to burn to death), and 
Emilie (whom he also betrayed). He furthermore becomes „gefan-
gen" in his own „widersprechenden Lügen" at the plot-level when he 
is caught trying to insinuate himself into Burton's household in order 
to murder Eduard. When confronted with his lies and criminal inten-
tions, Lovell cannot respond, which is to say, every utterance freezes 
Stanley Corngold emphasizes the strong sense of metapher in an astute piece on 
the literalization of metaphor in Kafka's Die Verwandlung. He describes this pro-
cess as a shift from metaphor to name: „If the metaphor is taken out of context, ho-
wever, if it is taken literally, it no longer functions as a vehicle but as a name, direc-
ting us to [the vehicle, the metaphor proper] as an abstraction or an object in the 
world." Stanley Corngold: Metamorphosis of Metaphor. In: Franz Kafka: The Ne-
cessity of Form. Ithaca 1988,55. My reading similarly tries to demonstrate how the 
metaphors of the fugitive self take on the same function as the name, both indexical 
and determinative. 
See Corkhill (Anm. 35), 181, where he notes that the flipside of linguistic skepti-
cism is a celebration of language as „Eigenrealität," a notion that the novel asserts 
tentatively, in his view. 
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in his mouth. After Lovell's failed attempt on his life, Burton writes, 
„ich muß ihn noch in dieser Nacht fortzuschaffen suchen, um ihn den 
Gerichten und dem Gefängnisse zu entziehen" (445). Lovell's identi-
ty as an empirical criminal is complete. The very metaphors used in 
place of a language proper become a more powerful language in that 
they direct essence. Lovell's „Marklosigkeit" as a character remains 
his constant susceptibility to the linguistic determination of his iden-
tity. 
VII. Conclusion: Turning Points 
The malleability of identity in William Lovell is suppressed by the 
prevalent discourse of a self impervious to language. However, the 
play of the name, along with the further instances of slippage from fi-
gure to deed, destabilizes this claim by uncovering a self permeated 
by language. The self's linguistic character surfaces in the text in sub-
tle ways. Karl Wilmont attempts, for example, to distance himself 
from all forms of figural language: 
[...] oratorische Wendungen, Tropen, Metaphern und alle Arten von Fi-
guren hab' ich rein vergessen, und ich selber spiele hier an meinem 
Schreibpulte eine höchst armselige Figur, indem ich die Feder beiße und 
mir mit der linken Hand in den Kopf kratze, um mich zu besinnen, was 
ich Dir wohl zu sagen haben könnte. (69) 
Wilmont's gesture of removing himself from figural language simul-
taneously situates him within it. It is clear that he has not forgotten all 
his tropes and figures, for his self-reflexive description of the scene of 
writing relies on a kind of „figural" play. The line, „ich selber spiele 
[...] eine höchst armselige Figur," turns on the ambiguity of the word 
„figure." That is, his statement that he plays the part of a miserable 
character (or figure) is contaminated by its proximity to the list of rhe-
torical forms, and one cannot read this line without a reminder of the 
preceding sense of „figure." In other words, the claim of being free 
from all rhetorical forms is immediately followed and undermined by 
a gesture of being completely overtaken by rhetorical forms: The I it-
self is a miserable figure. The character one plays is circumscribed by 
the very tropes and metaphors from which it is supposedly absent. 
Wilmont's reference to „oratorische Wendungen" returns us to one 
of Lovell's earliest statements, a passage in which he says he is now 
attentive to „wie von einem kleinen Zufalle, von einer unbedeutenden 
Kleinigkeit oft die Wendung unsers Charakters abhängt" (15, empha-
sis added; this letter directly follows the one from Wilmont that un-
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derscores the connection between Lovell and Liebe). The word Wen-
dung means a turn, primarily as in a turn of events, but also in the sen-
se of a trope, or a turn of phrase - hence Wilmonfs reference to ora-
torical expressions, oratorisehe Wendungen. The double sense of the 
„turn" in Lovell's above passage unites the turn of phrase with the 
turn of events, and the novel at large links them in a causal relations-
hip. The turn of phrase steers events in a particular direction; for Lo-
vell, they veer off course. Both depend upon an „insignificant detail," 
and in William's case, this detail is the expressive coincidence embed-
ded in his name. As we have seen in numerous examples, this bilin-
gual play governs the expression {Wendung) of his character, but it si-
multaneously governs the turn of events {Wendung) for his character, 
because the character's turn of events depends on a small detail within 
a tum of phrase. 
The characters' letters never state this openly, and one has to read 
against the grain of their lamentations to find the very kind of word-
play they deride. Here, as in „Eckbert," it is only by attending closely 
to each „unbedeutenden Kleinigkeit" that one uncovers what the nar-
rative itself would withhold. Behind the facade of a self impervious to 
the play of language lies a self contingent upon it. The discourse of the 
self as riddle asserts that something exists beyond language; it turns 
the inability to say definitively what the self is (besides something un-
sayable) into a problem of inadequate language rather than a problem 
of selfless-ness. By casting the self as a riddle, the characters plead for 
its profound, incommunicable essence. It turns out, however, that the 
solution is already present, embedded within the riddle's signifiers. 
That is, if the name William Lovell is forever detached from the es-
sence of a self, then the signifier substitutes for the missing self by 
constructing his identity out of it-self. He is love and nothing but love 
until a new turn of phrase inscribes itself upon his character. Words re-
place things because there is nothing to indicate that such a thing as a 
self or a character was present prior to the word that produced it. The 
name is what gives Lovell his „face" in the first place. 
In this sense, the epistolary novel is a perfect medium for represen-
ting the linguistic constitution of the self, for it includes, strictly spea-
king, no characters, no poles at which language either originates or 
arrives. It consists only of the medium of exchange, the transfer of 
language, and one then constitutes character positions on the basis of 
linguistic exchange.42 Can one really take the characters at their word 
42 William Lillyman also writes on the necessity of the novel's epistolary form, alt-
hough he sees it differently. I cannot agree with his reading when he grounds this 
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and try to read Lovell as the portrait of an inexpressible self? As Wil~ 
mont asks in the first letter of the novel: „Und würde die Welt nicht 
über Dich lachen, wenn Du den Zusammenhang hier vermißtest?" 
(14). It should laugh were we to miss the primacy of linguistic play 
over the stable essence of a self - a primacy that the story indicates at 
every turn. 
necessity in the crisis of language and the incommunicable self. For Liilyman, Lo-
velle story could never be told from the viewpoint of an omniscient narrator sin-
ce nobody else can know his essence." Lillyman: Reality's Dark Dream. Berlin 
1978, 25. 
